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United States Supreme Court
Surveys: 2017 Term
Digital Realty Trust v. Somers:
Whistleblowers and Corporate
Retaliation
Susan B. Heyman*
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following sequence of events. Paul Somers is a
Vice President of Portfolio Management at Digital Realty Trust,
Inc. (“Digital Realty”), a real estate investment trust that owns,
develops, and manages technology to make real estate transactions
more efficient.1 While working in Singapore, he reported to Kris
Kumar, a Senior Vice President, who developed the Asian Pacific
Region for Digital Realty.2 Somers believed that Kumar had
committed a number of securities violations, including hiding
millions of dollars in cost overruns on a Hong Kong development.3
He also believed Kumar eliminated certain internal controls in
violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act).4
* Professor of Law at Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 (N.D. Cal.
2015), aff’d, 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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Rather than ignoring these suspicions of misconduct, Somers
reported his concerns to Digital Realty’s officers, directors, and/or
managing agents.5 It is undisputed that Somers never reported his
concerns of misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).6 Shortly after making these internal reports, and despite
his record of superior achievements, Somers was terminated from
Digital Realty.7
Somers brought various claims against Digital Realty in
federal court for his allegedly wrongful termination, including a
whistleblower retaliation claim under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).8
Digital Realty moved to dismiss the retaliation claim arguing that
Somers could not seek protection under the Dodd-Frank Act
because he did not report the alleged violations to the SEC.9 The
district court denied the motion finding that the Dodd-Frank Act
“does not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining
‘whistleblower’ status . . . .”10 Finding the term “whistleblower”
ambiguous, the court applied the doctrine established in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and
accorded deference to the SEC’s definition of whistleblower.11 The
SEC interpreted the term whistleblower expansively to include
employees who internally report to their supervisors without also
reporting to the SEC.12 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.13
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision holding
that Chevron deference should not be given to the SEC
5. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1092.
6. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. 14-CV-05180-EMC, 2015 WL 13677868
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015).
7. Complaint at 3, Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (No. 3:14 CV-05180).
8. Id. at 8–9. In addition to the whistleblower retaliation claim, Somers
brought claims for disparate treatment and retaliation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, wrongful termination in violation of public policy,
breach of contract, and defamation. See id.
9. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1091–92.
10. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018) (citing
Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1095–96).
11. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
12. Id. For a discussion of the SEC rule, see infra section I.B.
13. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017),
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
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interpretation.14 Under a textualist approach, the Court concluded
that the plain language of the statute narrowly defined
“whistleblower” to include only individuals who report their
suspicions of misconduct directly to the SEC.15
Most whistleblowers report internally to their superiors, as
Somers did, and many never reveal their suspicions of misconduct
to the SEC.16 These internal reporters can no longer bring claims
in federal court under the Dodd-Frank Act and will instead have to
file administrative complaints as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, or in state court under various state statutes or common law.
Consequently, the case of Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers
is likely to have a significant impact on corporate compliance
programs.17 Limiting whistleblower status under the Dodd-Frank
Act undermines the protections available to attorneys and others
who have mandatory reporting obligations but may be limited by
state ethics rules from disclosing externally to the SEC. Further,
employees and others who do not have mandatory reporting
obligations may bypass corporate internal reporting protocols and
report directly to the SEC. Although the Digital Realty Court
suggested that Congress intended this result, it may have some
unintended consequences, such as delaying corrective action,
curtailing internal investigations, and draining government
resources. Without protection under the Dodd-Frank Act, some
employees may decide not to report suspicions of wrongdoing in
order to retain their jobs and preserve their reputations.18
Retaliatory measures can have devastating emotional and financial
effects on whistleblowers and their families, which create a huge
disincentive to reporting.19
14.
15.
16.

Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 781–82.
See id. at 776.
Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections, 33
YALE J. ON REG. 491, 493 (2016) (citing a survey of the Ethics Resource Center
finding that only two percent of employee-whistleblowers reported externally
without also reporting internally).
17. See infra section II for a discussion of how the narrow definition may
impact compliance programs.
18. Christina Pellino, Don’t Whistle While You Work – Unless You Whistle
to the SEC, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 911, 912 (2015) (discussing how deference
should be given to the SEC’s interpretation of “whistleblower”).
19. Pacella, supra note 16, at 493. In addition to being terminated from
employment, whistleblowers may be blacklisted from entire industries, or
ostracized and alienated from colleagues and friends. See id.
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This Survey is intended to provide a summary of the Digital
Realty case and discuss some of the consequences of the Court’s
narrow definition of whistleblower. Part I will discuss various
protections offered to whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and various state statutes, and will
discuss the Digital Realty decision. Then, Part II will discuss the
impact that the decision may have on corporate compliance
programs and some of the unintended consequences that may result
from the Court’s narrow interpretation. Finally, Part III will
discuss how the Court’s refusal to afford Chevron deference to the
SEC interpretation may be a sign of the Court’s willingness to
reconsider the doctrine under the right circumstances.
I.

SUPREME COURT ADOPTS NARROW DEFINITION OF
WHISTLEBLOWER

A. Whistleblower Protection Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Dodd-Frank Act, and State Statutes
There are three sources of whistleblower protection: state
statutes, common law wrongful discharge claims, and federal
statutes (including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank
Act).
1.

State Statutes and Common Law

Traditionally most jurisdictions strictly adhered to the
employment at-will doctrine, meaning that employers could
terminate employees, and employees could resign, for any reason or
for no reason at all.20 As common law developed, some states
adopted public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine and
restricted the ability of employers to terminate employees for
certain reasons, such as refusing to violate the law or reporting
such a violation.21 Other courts began recognizing causes of action
20. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 133, at 272 (2d ed. Albany, N.Y., John D. Parsons, Jr. 1886).
21. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387, 389
(Conn. 1980).
It would be difficult to maintain that the right to discharge an
employee hired at will is so fundamentally different from other
contract rights that its exercise is never subject to judicial scrutiny
regardless of how outrageous, how violative of public policy, the
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for retaliatory discharge by implying a duty of good faith and fair
dealing into the employment relationship.22 In these tort actions,
aggrieved employees were often awarded punitive damages for the
employer’s egregious conduct.23 While most states afford some
protection to whistleblowers, such protection is not adequate as
employees are often required to identify a well-established law that
is being violated in order to receive protection.24
In an attempt to provide additional protection, each state has
adopted some form of whistleblower statute that protects
employees from retaliation.25 These laws were all passed with the
same objective—”to expose, deter, and curtail wrongdoing.”26
However, the requirements that reporters must meet in order to be
protected vary considerably.27 Whether an employee is entitled to
bring a claim often depends on the applicable state law. For
instance, some statutes only protect external reporters,28 some only
protect certain classes of employees,29 some only protect employees
employer’s conduct may be........... [P]ublic policy imposes some limits
on unbridled discretion to terminate the employment of someone hired
at will.
Id. at 387.
22. Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 400 (Del. 2000) (citing E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442–44 (Del. 1996)) (“Delaware law
has evolved, however, through recognition of a limited implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as an exception to the harshness of the employment atwill doctrine.”).
23. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will
Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 449, 453 (1985) (analyzing the public policy
of awarding punitive damages for wrongful discharge claims).
24. See, e.g., Bohatch v. Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 543 (Tex. 1998) (holding
that a law firm partner could be expelled from the partnership for accusing
another partner of overbilling without exposing the partnership to a tort
claim).
25. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 99, 108 (2000).
26. Id. at 100.
27. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for
Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, at App. A (2004) (providing
summaries of each state’s whistleblower statute and listing relevant case law
from each jurisdiction).
28. A few states only provide protection to employees who report
misconduct to public bodies or to public officers with authority to act. See
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 25, at App. A.
29. Twenty-three states offer general protection to both private and public
employees, while twenty-four states provide general protection to only public
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after making a good faith attempt to determine accuracy of the
report,30 and some only protect reports of certain types of activity.31
Further, the remedies available to aggrieved employees vary
considerably.32 Accordingly, state whistleblower protection has
been described by several scholars as “murky, piecemeal, [and]
disorganized.”33
To highlight the disparate treatment of whistleblowers under
state law, consider two prominent and respected whistleblowers:
Sherron Watkins, Enron’s Chief Financial Officer, and Cynthia
Cooper, the head of internal auditing at WorldCom.34 Each of these
women played instrumental roles in exposing widespread
corruption at corporations by raising concerns of accounting fraud
to high-level executives. Neither of these employees reported their
suspicions to a government agency. While there is no principled
distinction in their respective situations, Cooper’s whistleblowing
would have been protected under Mississippi law,35 while Watkins’
whistleblowing would not have been protected under Texas law.36
Neither Texas nor Mississippi have adopted broad whistleblower
employees. See Cherry, supra note 27, at App. A.
30. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 25, at 121 (explaining that Ohio
only protects employees who make reasonable and good faith efforts to confirm
accuracy of report before disclosure).
31. For example, the New York statute only provides protection to
employees who report concerns relating to “a substantial and specific danger
to the public health or safety.” See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2002).
New York courts interpreting this statute have held that financial fraud is not
a danger to the public welfare and reporters of such misconduct are not
protected under the statute. See Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y.,
152 A.D.2d 169, 180–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that an employee who
reported suspicions of fraudulent loan practices as not protected by the
statute).
32. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 25, at 129–30 (explaining that the
majority of courts have not allowed punitive damages under the relevant
whistleblower statute and a few courts have not allowed actual damages in the
absence of express statutory language).
33. Cherry, supra note 27, at 1049.
34. Id. at 1035, 1039.
35. McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 604 (Miss. 1993)
(holding that “employee was not barred [by the employment at will doctrine]
from [bringing] tort actions for damages if employee refused to participate in
illegal act or if employee was discharged for reporting illegal acts of employer
to employer or anyone else”).
36. Austin v. Health Trust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998) (holding
that “Texas does not recognize common law cause of action for retaliatory
discharge of employee who reports illegal activities of others in workplace”).
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statutes to protect private employees such as Watkins and
Cooper.37 However, the Mississippi Supreme Court created a
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that
restricts an employer from retaliating against an employee
whistleblower.38 To the contrary, Texas has not provided for such
a general common law exception.39
2.

Federal Statutes

The federal protection available to whistleblowers before the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has also been described as “piecemeal.”40
Federal whistleblower protection originated in the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), which extended whistleblower
protection to federal employees “who disclose government illegality,
waste, and corruption.”41 This protection was seen as a necessary
step toward achieving a more effective civil service.42 A decade
later, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
(WPA), which established a private cause of action for federal
government employees.43 The stated purpose of the WPA was to
“strengthen and improve protection for the rights of Federal
employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing
within the Government.”44 Many scholars have commented that
the CSRA and WPA provide “illusory legal protections” and are
37. The public employee whistleblower statute would not have protected
Watkins. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.001 (West 1994). Nor would
the area specific whistleblower statutes. See, e.g., TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.
§ 125.013 (West 1995) (protecting reporters of agricultural hazards); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.110 (West 2002) (protecting reporters of child abuse and
neglect).
38. McArn, 626 So. 2d at 607.
39. City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 210, 216 (Tex. 2000)
(refusing “to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing on employers in light
of the variety of statutes that the Legislature has already enacted to regulate
employment relationships”). But see Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co.,
795 S.W.2d 723, 723–25 (Tex. 1990) (creating a narrow exception to the
employment at will doctrine, which requires a plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the discharge was based only on the
plaintiff’s refusal to perform an illegal act).
40. Cherry, supra note 27, at 1049.
41. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111
(codified as amended at various sections of 5 U.S.C.).
42. S. Rep. 95-969 (1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2746).
43. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat 16 (codified in various sections of 5
U.S.C.).
44. Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).

2019]

WHISTLEBLOWERS AND RETALIATION

85

ineffective. Further, these statutes only extend protection to
federal employees.
Many other federal statutes include whistleblower protections
for specific types of disclosures.45 Accordingly, a whistleblower
would be protected if he or she reported a violation of a federal
statute that included an anti-retaliation provision.46 For example,
if an employee reported an unfair labor practice violation, he or she
would be protected under federal law.47 On the other hand, if an
employee reported a different type of violation, which did not
include a retaliation provision, he or she would not be protected.
However, this stark distinction has been relaxed by recent Supreme
Court decisions. For example, the Court has held that several antidiscrimination statutes, including Title IX, that do not expressly
provide for anti-retaliation claims afford an implied cause of action
for retaliation and, therefore, provide federal whistleblower
protection.48
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to the
corporate and accounting scandals at the turn of the century. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was intended to promote corporate
accountability, protect investors, and protect employees who report
misconduct.49 It ameliorates some of the uneven treatment of
whistleblowers under various federal statutes, state statutes, and
common law exceptions to the traditional at-will doctrine.50
45. See Robert McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal
Whistleblowers, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 186 n.10 (2012).
46. For a summary of the federal statutes that include whistleblower
protections, see Cherry, supra note 27, at App. B.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2000).
48. See Kasteu v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 563 U.S. 1, 4 (2011)
(ruling that the anti-retaliation provision of the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act prohibits retaliation against employees who file complaints, including oral
complaints); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2007) (extending
whistleblower protection to employees who assert claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544
U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (extending whistleblower protection to employee who
protested the discrimination of a girls basketball team under Title IX of the
Civil Rights Act).
49. Several scholars have questioned the ultimate impact of the SarbanesOxley Act, as it makes “no direct effort to exhort, encourage or command
superior accounting or corporate governance.” Lawrence Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Just Might Work),
35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 920 (2003).
50. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012).
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Specifically, section 806 provides protections for employees of
publicly traded companies who report fraud internally to a person
with supervisory authority, to a member of Congress, or to a
government agency, such as the SEC.51
Despite this seemingly broad protection offered to employees of
publicly traded corporations, the Act imposes significant
restrictions on employee suits. For example, before commencing a
private cause of action, the Act requires an employee to exhaust all
administrative remedies by filing with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA).52 Such a complaint must be filed
within 180 days of the date of the violation or the date on which the
employee became aware of the violation.53 The employee may only
bring an action in federal court if OSHA does not issue a final
decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and the delay
is not attributable to the bad faith of the employee.54
Another limitation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that the
remedy available to an aggrieved employee is compensatory—the
goal is to make the aggrieved partly whole.55 Such relief includes
reinstatement with the same seniority, back pay with interest, and
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C).
No [public company] or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company . . . may discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee . . . because of any lawful act done by the
employee—(1) to provide information, cause information to be
provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any
conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes [certain
enumerated violations] . . . when the information or assistance is
provided to or the investigation is conducted by—(A) a Federal
regulatory or law enforcement agency; (B) any member of
Congress . . . or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the
employee . . . .
Id. §§ 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C).
52. Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). Congress delegated the administration of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act whistleblower claims to the Department of Labor, who
further delegated to the OSHA. See Secretary’s Order 5-2002, Delegation of
Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Assistant Secretary for
Occupational Safety and Health, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,008 (Oct. 22, 2002) (assigning
authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A to OSHA).
53. Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
54. Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
55. Id. § 1514A(c)(1).
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discrimination, such as litigation costs and attorney fees.56 Relief
does not include recovery of punitive damages that were available
under some statutes.57
Many scholars questioned whether the ostensibly broad
reforms included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were mere rhetoric or
legislative “silver bullets” that would effect change.58 Many of the
protections offered have been described as more “illusory than
real.”59 Despite the additional protections offered to whistleblowers
under the Act, the percentage of reporters dropped from 18.4% to
13.2% after its enactment.60 This decrease in reporters has been
attributed to the unavailability of punitive damages, the short
statute of limitations, and not being entitled to a jury trial under
the Act.61
To respond to shortcomings in financial regulation, Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Act. One shortcoming was the SEC’s ability
to identify securities law violations.62 The Act therefore included
“a new, robust whistleblower program designed to motivate people
who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC.”63 Congress
recognized that whistleblowers often face the difficult choice of
remaining silent or reporting and committing “career suicide.”64
Therefore, the new program includes both incentives and
protections.65 The incentives, which are outside the scope of this
56. Id. § 1514A(2).
57. Id. §§ 1514A(c)(1)–(2).
58. Cunningham, supra note 49, at 919.
59. Deborah L. Seifert et al., The Influence of Organizational Justice on
Accountant Whistleblowing, 35 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y, 707, 709 (2010).
60. See Samuel C. Leifer, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the
Dodd-Frank Act, 113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 128 (2014).
61. Isaac Halverson, Note, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Who Qualifies as
a Dodd-Frank Whistleblower?, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 505,
511 (2018).
62. Although Congress attempted to fill some gaps left open by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, some scholars have noted that the “piecemeal evolution of
whistleblower legislation . . . created regulatory and enforcement failures that
ultimately diminish whistleblower protections, and in turn, thwart corporate
governance.” Meera Kahn, Comment, Whistling in the Wind: Why Federal
Whistleblower Protections Fall Short of Their Corporate Governance Goals, 26
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 57, 57 (2018).
63. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010).
64. Id. at 111.
65. On May 25, 2011, the SEC released a set of finalized rules to
implement the whistleblower incentives and protections contained in section
922 of the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
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Survey, include a requirement for the SEC to pay significant
monetary awards to individuals who provide information to the
SEC, which leads to a successful enforcement action.66 The
protections include the creation of a private cause of action for
certain individuals (including attorneys and employees) against
corporations.
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded several protections offered to
whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by: (1) creating a
cause of action for all employees, not only those of publicly traded
companies, to immediately sue in federal court; (2) extending the
statute of limitations; and (3) increasing the potential remedy
available. Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act
does not include an administrative exhaustion requirement or 180day statute of limitations. Instead, a whistleblower may bring a
private cause of action against a current or former employer
directly in federal court within six years of the alleged violation.67
Further, the Dodd-Frank Act extends the remedies available to
aggrieved employees to include not only back-pay, but also double
back pay with interest.68
B. Defining “Whistleblower” Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Dodd-Frank Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act expressly extends whistleblower
protection to any employee of a publically traded company who
reports misconduct to a federal agency (including the SEC), any
member of Congress, or anyone with supervisory authority.69 Most
relevant here, the Act prohibits certain companies from:
Discriminat[ing] against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done
by the employee—(1) to provide information, cause
information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(b)(1)(A)–(B) (“[The SEC shall] pay an aggregate
amount equal to—(A) not less that 10 percent, in total of what has been
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions;
and (B) not more than 30 percent.”).
67. Id. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i), (h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)–(II). The default limitation
period is six years, but in some cases the limitation period may be as long as
ten years. Id.
68. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii).
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C).
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investigation regarding any conduct which the employee
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of [certain
criminal statutes], any rule or regulation of the [SEC], or
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.70
This protection would apply even if the information is only provided
internally to a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.71
Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act’s antiretaliation provision does not include an express definition of
whistleblower. Instead, the provision extends protection to any
individual who makes a disclosure that is “required or protected
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”72 As explained, the SarbanesOxley Act defines whistleblower as an employee who provides
information to “a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.”73 However, the definition section of the Dodd-Frank
Act, section 21F, includes a definition of whistleblower.74 This
definition is narrower than the Sarbanes-Oxley definition, as it only
includes individuals who provide “information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”75
Given these varying references to whistleblower under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC believed it was imperative to provide
guidance. In 2011, the SEC adopted regulations implementing the
Dodd-Frank Act and provided that for purposes of the antiretaliation provision, SEC reporting is not required.76 The SEC
70. Id. § 1514(a)(1).
71. Id. § 1514A(a)(1)(C).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
75. The statute states that the definition shall apply to § 78u-6.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)–(iii). The rule provides that:
(1) [F]or purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded [under
the Dodd-Frank Act] you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are
providing relates to a possible securities law violation . . . and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in [the DoddFrank Act].
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy
the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.
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interpreted the statute expansively to not only include protections
for individuals who report to the SEC, but also to individuals who
only report to their supervisors. For purposes of the award
provision, however, the rule requires a whistleblower to report
suspicions of an alleged securities law violation to the SEC.77
Some courts, however, declined to follow this SEC regulation.
This resulted in a circuit split over whether Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower protection only extends to employees who internally
report information to supervisors as implied by the definition in the
anti-retaliation section, or if whistleblowers must report to the SEC
to receive protection as required in the definition section. The
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits resolved these claims in three
distinct ways. The Second Circuit concluded that because the term
whistleblower was sufficiently ambiguous, Chevron deference
should apply to the SEC rule extending protection to internal
reporters.78 The Ninth Circuit did not defer to the SEC rule, but
still concluded that protection extends to internal whistleblowers.79
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language of
the statute only provides protection to individuals who disclose to
the SEC.80
The Supreme Court recently resolved this circuit split and
unanimously adopted a narrow definition of “whistleblower.”81 In
Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, the Court held that the DoddFrank Act only protected individuals who reported securities
violations directly to the SEC.82 In adopting the narrow definition
of the Fifth Circuit, the Court relied on: (1) the express definition of
“whistleblower” under the Act; and (2) the purpose of the DoddId.
77. Id. § 240.21F-2(a)(2).
78. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding
that the Dodd-Frank Act covers internal reporters because the statute is
ambiguous and Chevron allows for deference to the SEC’s interpretation of
whistleblower), abrogated by Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767
(2018).
79. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017),
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
80. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the employee was not protected against retaliation under the
Dodd-Frank Act because the plain language of the whistleblower provision
only protects individuals who disclose to the SEC).
81. See Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 772–73.
82. Id.

2019]

WHISTLEBLOWERS AND RETALIATION

91

Frank Act.83
The Court held that under a plain reading of this provision, an
employee is required to provide information to the SEC in order to
obtain protection against retaliation.84 The Court reasoned that
the condition must be satisfied because “[c]ourts are not at liberty
to dispense with the condition—tell the SEC—Congress
imposed.”85
Further, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, in which
Justice Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined,
reasoned that this textual reading comports with the legislative
purpose of the Act.86 The Senate Report stated that the core
purpose of the robust whistleblower protection is to “motivate
people who know of securities violations to tell the SEC.”87 To
achieve that goal, the Court explained, Congress heightened
protection against retaliation to whistleblowers who provide
actionable information to the SEC.88
In the first concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by
Justices Alito and Gorsuch, disagreed with the majority’s reliance
on the Senate Report to determine Congress’ intent.89 These
Justices concurred with the majority opinion to the extent it relied
on the text of the Dodd-Frank Act itself. They believe that a
statute’s purpose and interpretation should be derived solely from
the plain text of the statute.90
By contrast, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote
a second concurring opinion only to note their disagreement with
Justice Thomas’ suggestion that a Senate Report is not an
appropriate interpretive tool for determining the meaning of a
statute.91
II. INTERNAL REPORTING AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

In response to the corporate scandals at the turn of the century,
83. Id. at 776–78.
84. Id. at 778.
85. Id. at 777.
86. See id. at 777–78.
87. Id. at 777.
88. Id. at 778.
89. Id. at 783 (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 782 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Congress included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act a requirement that
public companies establish internal reporting systems for
employees to report misconduct to management.92 Such reports
allow corporations to remedy problems internally without negative
publicity.93 In order to encourage employees to report, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides protection against retaliation to any
employee who reports misconduct to a supervisor.94 Jane Norberg,
the chief of the SEC’s Whistleblowing Office, explained that
protecting internal whistleblowers from retaliation is critical to the
SEC’s enforcement efforts: “Put simply, if individuals are not
assured that they will be protected from retaliation if they report
internally, they will be less likely to report internally, which could
undermine the important role that internal compliance programs
play in helping the Commission prevent, detect, and stop securities
law violations.”95
One of the arguments made by Somers, the Solicitor General,
and the SEC in the Digital Realty case was that limiting
whistleblower status under the Dodd-Frank Act to include only
individuals who report to the SEC would undermine the protections
available to auditors, attorneys, and other employees subject to
internal reporting requirements.96 For example, under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, attorneys who appear or practice before the
SEC are required to report internally and may later report to the
SEC only under certain circumstances.97 Specifically, attorneys are
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (2012) (requiring covered companies to
establish internal reporting procedures for questionable conduct and for the
anonymous submission of complaints).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C).
95. Jane Norberg, Keynote Address, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 386,
397 (2018).
96. Brief for Respondent at 35, Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. 767 (No. 161276); Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
21, Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. 767 (No. 16-1276).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014).
An attorney may report a violation externally without the consent of
the client if the attorney reasonably believes it necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation likely
to cause substantial financial injury to the financial interests or
property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer . . . from committing any act . . . that is likely
to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or
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required to report “evidence of a material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation” up the ladder to the
general counsel of the company or the CEO.98 If the response is
inadequate, the lawyer must disclose it to the audit committee or
any other committee comprised of independent directors. However,
an attorney may only ignore ordinary privilege rules and report to
the SEC under limited circumstances under the SEC rules,99 and
under even fewer circumstances under some state ethics rules.100
For instance, the ethics rules in a few jurisdictions limit an
attorney’s ability to make external reports of some financial crimes
or non-criminal frauds.101 Accordingly, an attorney who
improperly reports a violation may be at risk of professional
disciplinary investigation or action for violating the privilege.102
The SEC and some scholars have claimed that rules
encouraging attorney disclosure under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or
Dodd-Frank Act should preempt state ethics rules.103 However,

(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer
that caused . . . substantial injury to the financial interest property of
the issuer or investors in furtherance of which the attorney’s services
were used or illegal act in which the attorney’s services have been
used.

Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. See also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys (Final Rule), Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-47276 (Jan. 29, 2003). Section 205 applies to attorneys
appearing and practicing before the SEC, which is broadly defined to include
merely advising on a securities law issue that the lawyer has notice will be
incorporated in a document filed with the SEC.
100. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Stitches for Snitches: Lawyers as
Whistleblowers, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1455, 1548 (2017) (providing a state-bystate chart of ethics rules).
101. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2018) (permitting
attorneys to reveal confidential client information only when necessary to
prevent a criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily injury).
102. Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Law to Break First: An In-House
Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal
Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3341 (2014) (proposing
that in-house attorneys should be permitted to report federal securities
violations externally if their internal report does not resolve the violation).
103. See Pacella, supra note 16, at 527–45 (proposing amendments to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to clarify when external reporting is permissible, and
modifications to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 to allow attorneys to
externally report misconduct).
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several scholars104 and respected state bar associations, including
Washington, California, and New York disagree with this
approach.105 These states question the SEC’s preemption rule,
which provides that an attorney who makes a report to the SEC in
good faith, under circumstances permitted by the SEC but not
applicable state law “shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise
liable under inconsistent standards.”106 For example, the
Washington State Bar Association issued an interim opinion
disagreeing with the SEC’s claim that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
preempted state ethics rules.107 The SEC responded with a
comment letter explaining that the Supreme Court has consistently
“upheld the authority of federal agencies to implement rules of
conduct that diverge from and supersede state laws that address
the same conduct.”108 Despite this comment letter, the bar
association adopted the interim opinion.109 The preemption issue
has not been decided by the courts and many attorneys may not be
willing to take the risk of disciplinary action when deciding whether
to report their client’s misconduct.110
The Solicitor General argued that the narrow definition of
104. See, e.g., Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovitz, Lawyers as
Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical
Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC Rules, 84 NYSBA
J. 10, 19 (July/Aug. 2012) (“It feels disquieting, and is perhaps
unconstitutional, for the federal government to arrogate itself the power to
purport to regulate state attorney ethics.”).
105. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 100.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2003).
107. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 100.
108. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, SEC Gen. Counsel, to J. Richard
Manning, President, Wash. State Bar Ass’n, and David W. Savage, PresidentElect, Wash. State Bar Ass’n (July 23, 2003) (available at
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm)
[https://perma.cc/5RGMU3TX].
109. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 100.
110. Lawrence A. West, Eric R. Swibel & Jenny Allen, Will Award-Seeking
Whistleblower Lawyers Be Caught Between Conflicting SEC and State Ethics
1, 6 (Oct. 21, 2013),
Rules?, LATHAM & WATKINS LITIG. DEP’T
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblower-ethics-conflict
[https://perma.cc/N3TW-C5NZ] (demonstrating that lawyers who report
wrongdoing to the SEC may be subject to discipline for breaching the attorneyclient privilege under inconsistent state ethics standards); see also Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (limiting the ability of the federal
government to interfere with attorney-client confidential communications,
protected by state law).
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whistleblower would leave attorneys and other employees
“vulnerable to discharge or other retaliatory action for complying
with” their reporting obligations.111 The Court responded to this
argument by explaining that even under the narrow definition, the
individual would be protected against retaliation as soon as he or
she also discloses the information to the SEC.112 Although the
individual would not be protected if the retaliation occurs before the
attorney has a chance to report to the SEC, the Court reasoned that
such a result is consistent with the legislative intent to encourage
SEC disclosure.113 Also, such an individual would still be protected
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other anti-retaliation statutes.114
The Digital Realty holding deprives attorney whistleblowers
who comply with their reporting obligations under the SarbanesOxley Act by reporting up the ladder, but not disclosing confidential
information to the SEC, from any recourse for retaliation under the
Dodd-Frank Act. Although, as the Court mentions, attorneys may
have recourse under state tort law and other federal statutes, these
sources provide relatively weak remedies and have proven
ineffective at offering adequate protection.115 For example,
whistleblowers seeking protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
would need to file within shorter statutory periods and would have
restrictions on where they can bring their claim.116
This leaves lawyers subject to the attorney-client privilege in a
precarious situation. They can either forego the additional
protections available under the Dodd-Frank Act or they can report
violations to the SEC and possibly subject themselves to state
disciplinary action for breaching their duty of confidentiality.117
The concerns are even worse for in-house counsel who depend on a
111. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
21, Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (No. 16-1276).
112. Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 780.
113. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 111-176 at 38).
114. Id. (citing Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 468–69 (2014)).
115. Pacella, supra note 16, at 492–93.
116. To the extent that state ethics rules require reporting to supervisors
and supervisors fail to take action, it may be impossible to comply with the
180-day filing requirement, and in any event the lawyer would have much less
than 180 days to file the complaint.
117. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2007) (explaining that the duty of
confidentiality is much broader than the attorney-client privilege).
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single client for their livelihood.118 This may lead to less reporting
and undermine one of Congress’ mandates in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act—that attorneys report up the corporate ladder “evidence of a
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation.”119 It would also undermine the Dodd-Frank Act
which incorporated this reporting mandate.
Further, the narrow interpretation of whistleblower may
incentivize corporations to terminate attorneys before they can
report to the SEC. Lawyers are therefore uniquely vulnerable to
retaliation between the time he or she internally reports
misconduct and his or her determination that he or she may report
externally to the SEC. After the lawyer is terminated it is unlikely
that the lawyer can report to the wrongdoing without violating his
or her duty of confidentiality.120
There are similar problems with respect to employees who do
not have internal reporting obligations. Since the Court’s decision
does not extend whistleblower protection to employees who only
internally report, it may encourage employees to bypass corporate
internal reporting procedures and go directly to the SEC.121
Although the Court suggests that this may be the outcome that
Congress intended, the holding may have some unintended
consequences. If employees report directly to the SEC, it will
circumvent the corporation’s internal controls.122 It will also
impact an employer’s ability to internally resolve the problem
without government involvement, or to self-report to the SEC and
obtain credit for such disclosure.123 Fewer internal reports to
118. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel
as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1005 (2005) (explaining the
importance of retaliation protection for in house attorneys). A terminated inhouse attorney loses his or her entire income, insurance, pension, and stock
options.
119. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
68 Fed. Reg. 6296-01 (Feb. 6, 2003) (Release Nos. 33–8185; 34–47276).
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(C) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983) (“A
lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter . . . shall not
thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require
with respect to a client ”); see generally Sarah C. Haan, Whistling Loud
and Clear: Applying Chevron to Subsection 21F of Dodd-Frank, 75 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 565 (2018).
121. See generally Halverson, supra note 61.
122. Hann, supra note 119, at 571.
123. Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws:
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management may also delay corrective action.124 Further, internal
reporting has the benefit of avoiding negative publicity, promoting
employee loyalty, and maintaining the chain of command.125
In addition to the potential harm to a corporation caused by
employees bypassing internal reporting procedures, there are also
risks to the government. The decision may lead to over-reporting
to the SEC of meritless claims which were previously screened out
by internal compliance programs. Rather than corporations using
their own resources to investigate potential wrongdoing in the first
instance, external reporting will result in the government
conducting more burdensome and costly investigations which could
drain their limited resources. The SEC has recognized that a
possible effect is “an overflow of noisy signals—that is, a large
number of tips of varying quality—causing the Commission to incur
costs to process and validate the information.”126 Internal
reporting has the potential to allow corporations to remedy
misconduct without draining government resources.127
Despite the concerns that the Digital Realty holding may
undermine some corporate compliance programs, corporations
should continue to ensure that they have a culture and process
which encourages internal reporting. Such internal reports
minimize the risk of damaging government investigations and
increases the chances that the corporation will receive cooperation
credit from the government.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND CHEVRON DEFERENCE

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 1633, 1634 (2008) (proposing that states adopt a more flexible approach
that would protect internal and external reporters so long as the employee
believed that the recipient could correct the misconduct).
124. Ronald H. Filler & Jerry W. Markham, Whistleblowers – A Case Study
in the Regulatory Cycle for Financial Services, BROOKLYN J. COR. FIN. & COMM.
L. 311, 318 (2018).
125. Id.
126. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70, 4888,
70,516 (Nov. 17, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (discussing the
purpose of a reporting grace period of ninety days for the whistleblower award
program).
127. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb.
2014).

98

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:78

Inc., the Supreme Court held that when a statute is ambiguous and
the SEC’s interpretation is reasonable, courts are required to give
deference to the agency construction.128 Before Chevron, deference
was only mandatory when Congress explicitly delegated
interpretative authority to the agency.129 Rather than limiting
deference in this way, the Court established a two–step test to
determine when judicial deference to an agency construction of a
statute is required:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.130
The Chevron Court reasoned that when there is an express or
implied delegation of power from Congress to an agency to fill a gap
in a statute, the agency is authorized to clarify the provisions in the
statute through regulation.131 If the agency creates a rule, under
an express delegation, the rule should be adjudged a “permissible
construction of the statute” so long as it is not “arbitrary, capricious
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”132 However, if the agency
acts under implied delegation, the rule should be adjudged a
permissible construction if it is reasonable in light of the enabling
legislation.133
The rationale behind the Chevron doctrine is that ambiguities
128. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (stating that an agency’s interpretation of
a statute was entitled to mandatory deference even though it was not
promulgated under an explicit delegation of authority).
129. See id. at 843–44.
130. Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).
131. Id. at 843–44.
132. Id. at 844.
133. Id. at 844–45.
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in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are implied
delegations of authority to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable
manner; filling these gaps, as the Court explained, involves difficult
policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than
courts.134 Between the two, agencies possess greater subject
matter expertise and better understand policies implicated along
with potential consequences of alternative resolutions to statutory
ambiguities.135
In Digital Realty, Somers and the Solicitor General argued that
the term “whistleblower” in the anti-retaliation section of the DoddFrank Act was ambiguous and the SEC rule defining whistleblower
should apply under the Chevron doctrine.136 The Dodd-Frank Act’s
definition section, section 21F, defined whistleblower as “any
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of
the securities laws to the Commission.”137 However, the antiretaliation section expressly provides protection against retaliation
when an individual makes “disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”138 The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act protects both internal and external whistleblowers.139
Accordingly, Somers and the Solicitor General argued that the term
“whistleblower” is ambiguous and the Court should afford deference
to the SEC interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.140 The SEC
rule provides that the term “whistleblower” for purposes of the antiretaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act includes employees who
only make internal reports of misconduct.141 Finding this
argument unpersuasive, the Court held that Dodd-Frank’s
definition of whistleblower was unambiguous and precluded the
SEC from more expansively defining that term.142 This meant that
the Court was able to set aside the agency interpretation without
disturbing the holding in Chevron.
Although the Court did not question the constitutionality of the
Chevron doctrine, such an inquiry was suggested in defendant’s
134. Id. at 865–66.
135. Id. (emphasizing that judges are not experts in every field).
136. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
138. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
140. Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 776.
141. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2(b)(i)–(iii) (2013).
142. Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 781–82.
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reply brief. In its brief, Digital Realty argued that if the Court
concluded that the statutory text was ambiguous and deference
should be given to the SEC rule, it should “order supplemental
briefing to consider whether Chevron should be overruled.”143
Digital Realty was inviting the Court to reconsider a three-decadeold basic premise of administrative law.
If the Court had reconsidered the Chevron decision as
suggested by Digital Realty, it appears that at least two justices
may have concluded that the doctrine is unconstitutional. While
sitting on the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote powerfully about how Chevron is an
unconstitutional abdication of judicial and congressional power
under the separation of powers doctrine.144 Similarly, Justice
Thomas in Michigan v. EPA, expressed concern that Chevron
deference vests the executive branch with power the Constitution
has granted only to Congress.145 Although Chief Justice Roberts is
not as extreme, he has advocated for a narrower, context-specific,
expertise-driven application of the doctrine.146 In King v. Burwell,
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, adopted a “Step
Zero” exception to the Chevron doctrine.147 The Court held that
Chevron deference was not applicable to certain major questions
without a clear congressional intent to delegate beyond just mere
ambiguity in the text.148 In a concurring opinion in Pereira v.
143. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 22 n.3, Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. 767
(No. 16-1276).
144. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch published both the majority opinion
and a concurrence in the same case; in his concurrence, he criticized the
doctrine as a “goliath of modern administrative law” that is “more than a little
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.” Id. at 1149,
1158.
145. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Statutory
ambiguity thus becomes an implicit delegation of rule-making authority, and
that authority is used not to find the best meaning of the text, but to formulate
legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on policy judgments made by the
agency.”).
146. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 321–22 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“An agency interpretation warrants such deference only if
Congress has delegated authority to definitively interpret a particular
ambiguity in a particular manner.”).
147. See 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
148. Id. The Court in King refused to give deference to the IRS’
interpretation of the availability of tax credits under the Affordable Care Act
because the question was one of “deep ‘economic and political significance’” that
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Sessions, Justice Kennedy noted the concerns raised by some
members of the Court and explained that “it seems necessary and
appropriate to reconsider . . . the premises that underlie Chevron
and how courts have implemented that decision.”149
The Supreme Court did not use the Digital Realty case as an
opportunity to re-consider the scope of the Chevron doctrine.
However, the holding demonstrates that courts can narrow the
application of the doctrine by concluding that the text of the statute
is not ambiguous. In Pereira v. Sessions, decided a few months after
Digital Realty, the Court again concluded that a term was
unambiguous.150 The Court reached this conclusion despite the
fact that it went through eight pages to explain the statute’s plaintext meaning, and it disagreed with six appellate courts and the
responsible agency over whether the term was ambiguous.151 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito criticized the Court for ignoring
Chevron and refusing to accord deference to the agency
interpretation.152 As he explained, “unless the Court has overruled
Chevron in a secret decision that has somehow escaped my
attention, it remains good law” and should be followed or openly
reexamined.153 He also expressed concern that the doctrine that
was once “celebrated” has been “increasingly maligned.”154 Digital
is central to this statutory scheme, and Congress did not expressly delegate
that question to the IRS to consider. Id. at 2489 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). Also, the Court found that it was
unlikely that Congress would have delegated a major question to an agency
with no expertise in the subject matter. Id. (“It is especially unlikely that
Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise
in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”). Scholars have questioned
whether this exception “has staying power to narrow Chevron’s domain, or
whether it was just a one-off application based on extraordinary
circumstances.” Christopher Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron
Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2016).
149. 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the
issuance of notice requirement in a federal immigration statute that does not
state a time and place for removal hearing, but states that a hearing will be
held at a time and place to be later specified, is not ambiguous and the BIA
interpretation was not entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine).
150. Id. at 2113 (majority opinion).
151. Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[A] straightforward application of
Chevron requires us to accept the Government’s construction . . . I can only
conclude that the Court is simply ignoring Chevron.”).
153. Id. at 2129.
154. Id. at 2121.
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Realty, Pereira, and several other recent decisions may be signposts
that the Court is waiting for a good case to reexamine Chevron
deference.155
Although the SEC rule defining whistleblower was not entitled
to deference, scholars have suggested that the SEC may be able to
protect internal whistleblowers by exempting individuals from
external reporting requirements.156 Congress explicitly granted
the SEC general authority to exempt any class or person from
Dodd-Frank requirements.157 It is unclear whether the Court
would give deference to such an exemption under the Chevron
doctrine since it has already decided that the definition of
whistleblower is unambiguous.158 However, some lower courts and
the Third Circuit have concluded that an agency may exercise its
exemptive authority even if a statute is clear because, in granting
agencies broad exemptive power, Congress intended to provide
them the ability to deal with unforeseeable problems that may arise
under the statutes.159
CONCLUSION

Whistleblowers protect corporations, shareholders, and society
at large by preventing or reducing corporate wrongdoing and
forcing information up the ladder or into the public domain.
However, whistleblowers such as Paul Somers, Sherron Watkins,
and Cynthia Cooper subject themselves to devastating
consequences for reporting suspicions of misconduct. Recognizing
155. Several recent cases seem to suggest the Court’s willingness to
reconsider Chevron. For example, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court
mentioned that “[n]o party to these cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron,”
which suggests that such a request may have been considered. See 138 S. Ct.
1612, 1629 (2018) (holding that Chevron does not apply where two federal
agencies formally disagree over statute’s meaning).
156. Lesley Chen, Comment, The SEC’s Forgotten Power of Exemption: How
the SEC Can Receive Deference in Favor of Internal Whistleblowers Even When
the Text is Clear, 67 EMORY L. J. 1043, 1049 (2018).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2012).
158. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
159. See AARP v. Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n, 489 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir.
2007) (holding that the EEOC may exercise its exemptive authority even if
there is no ambiguity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); see also
Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that the SEC
exempts long-term profits realized by officers and major stockholders by
exercise of an option from forfeiture to their corporation because Congress
explicitly granted them this exemptive authority).
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that these whistleblowers deserve protection and existing federal,
state. and local law was inadequate, Congress adopted the antiretaliation provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded several of the protections
available to whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and prior
federal statutes, such as the ability to bring a cause of action
directly into federal court and to recover more than compensatory
damages. In determining which reporters would be considered
whistleblowers under the anti-retaliation section of the Act, the
Digital Realty Court relied on a plain reading approach and applied
the definition of whistleblower provided in the definition section of
the Act. The definition of whistleblower was narrow and only
included individuals who reported to the SEC—reporters unlike
Paul Somers. The Court explained that the plain meaning
approach comports with the legislative intent of the Act—to
encourage individuals to report directly to the SEC. Since the Court
concluded that the statute was clear and unambiguous, it did not
defer to the SEC rule defining whistleblower more expansively.
Although the narrow definition of whistleblower may encourage
external reporting, the decision may have some unintended
consequences on corporate compliance programs, forum shopping,
and the strength of the Chevron doctrine.

